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CONTROLLING HUMANS AND MACHINES 
Bryant Walker Smith* 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the debate over the ―meaningful human control‖ of lethal weapons, 
this is a limited piece. It takes no position on whether an otherwise lawful killing 
is, or should, be unlawful when carried out by an automated agent instead of by a 
human agent. It also takes no position on whether such an automated agent—a so-
called autonomous weapon system (AWS)—is, or should be, unlawful per se. 
Furthermore, the piece assumes that some concept of ―meaningful human control‖ 
is, or will become, relevant to international humanitarian law‘s (IHL) treatment of 
these systems. Unlike most articles considering ―meaningful human control,‖ this 
article does not focus on the role that a human should play in an otherwise 
automated weapon system.  Rather, it reverses these human and machine roles to 
consider automated systems that limit human-initiated lethal force. After 
discussing the concept of control generally, this piece argues, first, that a bias 
toward human authority could impede eventual restrictions on that authority and, 
second, that the line between automated systems that initiate lethal force and 
automated systems that restrict that force is potentially unclear. 
ON CONTROL 
As others have observed, ―meaningful human control‖ is intuitively appealing 
even though—or perhaps because—it is substantively ambiguous.  Content can be 
supplied to this term of art but should not be assumed.  This is because ―control‖ 
has too many meanings in too many contexts to universally express anything 
useful.  Its object can be an actor or an action, and its effect can be to check or to 
 
*Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law and (by courtesy) School of 
Engineering; Affiliate Scholar at the Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School; 
Faculty Affiliate, Rule of Law Collaborative; Chair, Emerging Technology Law Committee of 
the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies. I wrote this short piece as part of a 
conference sponsored by the Institute for International Law and Public Policy at Temple 
University Beasley School of Law and the International Committee of the Red Cross. I am 
grateful to the organizers of this conference for soliciting my piece and to the editors of the 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal for publishing it. All of my relevant 
publications are available at http://www.newlypossible.org.  
1. See, e.g., Paul Sharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems 6 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for a New American 
Security) (describing the relationship between a person and the machine in the section ―Human-
Machine Command-and-Control Relationship‖). 
2. See Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Sharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon 
Systems: A Primer 6 (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for a New 
American Security) (explaining the definition of ―meaningful human control‖). 
3. See id. at 15 (explaining that ―meaningful human control‖ must be used in context). 
4. See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United 
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commandeer.  This can lead to confusion: 
 
Because they obscure rather than clarify that system, casual references to 
humans who are ―in control,‖ ―in the loop,‖ ―out of control,‖ or ―out of 
the loop‖ and to automated systems that are ―under control,‖ ―under 
human control,‖ ―under computer control,‖ or ―out of control‖ are 
particularly unhelpful. 
 
Phrases like these are susceptible to numerous technical, legal, and 
popular interpretations. Consider, for example, the ―control‖ of an 
automated vehicle. An engineer might picture a real-time control loop 
with sensors and actuators, a lawyer might envision a broad grant of 
authority from human to machine analogous to a principal-agent 
relationship, and the public might imagine runaway cars and killer 
robots.  
 
In other words, control is, as a concept, essentially uncontrollable. Because of 
this potential for significant confusion, the standards organization formerly known 
as the Society of Automotive and Aerospace Engineers studiously avoided the 
general term ―control‖ in defining levels of driving automation.  Its definitions 
document instead specifies the respective roles of human driver and automated 
driving system at each level.  The Defense Science Board, while rejecting levels of 
automation, likewise conceives of humans not as external supervisors of a given 
system, but rather as internal participants in a broader system.  
These approaches are consistent with a disciplined approach to engineering 
control theory, in which engineers ―first describe the control system they actually 
intend: the goals, inputs, processes, and outputs to the extent they are determined 
by a human designer and the authority of the human or computer agents to the 
extent they are not.‖  This discipline, however, is sometimes lacking in the 
engineering realm and is further challenged when that realm overlaps with law.  
I first analyzed ―control‖ at length in the context of automated motor 
 
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 436–37 (2014). 
5. See, e.g., id. 
6. Bryant Walker Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language, 
in ROBOT LAW 83–84 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016). 
7. See Bryant Walker Smith, Summary of Levels of Driving Automation for On-Road 
Vehicles, SAE LEVELS OF DRIVING AUTOMATION (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://cyberlaw. 
stanford.edu/loda (showing levels of driving automation for on-road vehicles).  
8. See id. 
9. See DEP‘T OF DEF., DEF. SCI. BD., THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 23–24 
(2012), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf (discussing why defining levels of 
automation is not useful). 
10. See Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language, supra note 
6, at 85 (explaining the importance of defining ―control‖ in structural terms). 
11. See id. (providing an example of the difference between an engineer‘s visions versus a 
lawyer‘s vision). 
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vehicles.  The requirement in two multilateral treaties on road traffic that 
―[d]rivers shall at all times be able to control their vehicles or guide their 
animals‖  led to concern in Europe that these conventions would impede the broad 
deployment of automated motor vehicles.  Within the United Nations committee 
responsible for these treaties, States have expressed a variety of perspectives on the 
compatibility of this provision with automated driving and, at least implicitly, on 
the proper meaning of control.  
The successful amendment of one of these two road traffic conventions 
suggests that States believe that drivers are still ―able to control their vehicles‖ if 
they can ―override‖ or ―switch off‖ any ―vehicle systems which influence the way 
[their] vehicles are driven.‖  This clarification is striking because it codifies a 
driver‘s authority to disable vehicle systems that may be intended to enhance 
safety.  Two considerations do temper this conclusion. First, per the amendment, a 
vehicle system that complies with international automotive regulations does not 
need to permit human override.  Second, the ability to control is different than the 
exercise of control.  
Many legal questions implicate this ―complex spectrum‖ of control,  
particularly where retrospective responsibility (i.e., liability) is linked to 
prospective responsibility (i.e., obligation).  The responsibility of individual 
commanders for war crimes committed by others is premised on a narrow 
conception of ―effective control.‖  Similarly, the International Court of Justice and 
 
12. See Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, supra note 4, 
at 435–41 (analyzing ―control‖ in the context of motor vehicles). 
13. Geneva Convention on Road Traffic art. 8, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125 U.N.T.S. 
3. In a slight change of wording, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic states that ―[e]very 
driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle or to guide his animals.‖ Convention on 
Road Traffic art. 8, Nov. 8, 1968, 1042 U.N.T.S. 17. 
14. See Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, supra note 4, 
at 431–32 (explaining various viewpoints on the meaning of control and how it is interpreted in 
different ways). 
15. See id. (discussing positions taken by Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands 
regarding the provision‘s application to driver assistance systems). 
16. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm‘n for Europe, Inland Transp. Comm., Rep. of 
the sixty-eighth session of the Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, ECE/TRANS/WP.1/145 




19. See Axcelis Techs., Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc., No. CIV.A 01- 10029DPW, 2002 
WL 31761283, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 2002) (suggesting a difference between ability to control 
and exercising control). 
20. See Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, supra note 4, 
at 420–22 nn. 34–42 (explaining the various factors that complicate the term ―control‖). 
21. See Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language, supra note 
6, at 8 (explaining how liability can be defined in a legal, technical, and moral sense). 
22. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28, U.N. 
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the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have disagreed about the 
conditions under which a State exercises enough control over another entity that 
the actions of that entity are attributable to the State.  In the United States, 
Congress deliberately declined to define ―control‖ in the context of securities, 
while the Securities and Exchange Commission subsequently adopted a broad 
definition premised on the possession, rather than the exercise, of power.  
Corresponding terms within various languages may also reflect subtle differences 
in the conception of control.  
The concern here is not that ―meaningful human control‖ is indefinable. Like 
any term of art, this phrase can be defined as precisely as language allows. Indeed, 
its original proponents have stated that meaningful human control over an 
individual attack requires, at a minimum, adequate information, positive action, 
and corresponding accountability.  
The concern, rather, is practical: Merely defining a term will not banish its 
many other connotations or even its many other denotations. Even though the 
original proponents of ―meaningful human control‖ focused on individual attacks, 
their term ―is entering currency without this modifier, leading to various 
interpretations‖ involving, for example, control over ―weapon systems‖ or ―the 
critical functions of autonomous weapons.‖  
Once unmoored, terms can float far from their original meaning. As the 
examples above suggest, ―control‖ faces an especially turbulent sea.  Invoking 
 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) (explaining the responsibility of commanders and other 
superiors). 
23. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶115 (June 27) (explaining the effective control doctrine); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶584 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (explaining the overall control doctrine). 
24. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) (―When reference is made to ‗control,‘ the term is 
intended to include actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control . . . . 
It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to 
enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A few 
examples of the methods used are stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well known 
that actual control sometimes may be exerted through ownership of much less than a majority of 
the stock of a corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or through such ownership 
in combination with other factors.‖); see also Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 526 F.3d 715, 
722–23 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (―Congress recognized that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to enumerate or anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exercised 
and expressly declined to define the term ‗control,‘ leaving courts free to decide issues of control 
status on a case by case basis.‖). 
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 26 (stating that defining the term ―control‖ would be 
difficult, if not impossible, because the term can be enumerated or anticipated in many ways). 
26. Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 36, 3–4 
(Apr. 2013), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Policy_Paper1.pdf. 
27. UNIDIR, The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Considering 
How Meaningful Human Control Might Move the Discussion Forward, No. 2 UNIDIR 
Resources, 1–2 (2014), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-meaning 
ful-human-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward-en-615.pdf. 
28. See Smith, supra note 4, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 
at 438 (noting that the term ―control‖ arguably has no original meaning because it can be defined 
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some notion of control invites, even if unintentionally or unknowingly, myriad 
popular, technical, and legal views of the concept. As the next section argues, one 
of these views—the primacy of human authority—may be especially problematic. 
RESTRICTIONS ON HUMAN AUTHORITY 
Other scholars have recognized that machines can limit as well as initiate 
killing.  Smart locks for guns and launch codes for nuclear missiles, for example, 
restrict the access of some—indeed, most—individuals to particular weapons.  
Landmines that neutralize themselves and cluster munitions that explode only 
under particular conditions may at least be preferable to those that do not. 
Geofencing might be used to prevent the targeting of hospitals or friendly units.  I 
cannot conceive of all the ways in which technologies might someday check the 
 
or understood in so many different ways). 
29. See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, in JEAN PERKINS TASK 
FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW ESSAY SERIES, 15 (The Hoover Institution, Apr. 10, 
2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3963-anderson-k-waxman-mlaw-and-ethics-for-
autonomouspd (―We should not rule out in advance possibilities of positive technological outcomes—
including the development of technologies of war that might reduce risks to civilians by making 
targeting more precise and firing decisions more controlled (especially compared to human-soldier 
failings that are so often exacerbated by fear, panic, vengeance, or other emotions—not to mention the 
limits of human senses and cognition). It may well be, for instance, that weapons systems with greater 
and greater levels of automation can—in some battlefield contexts, and perhaps more and more over 
time—reduce misidentification of military targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, 
or allow for using smaller quanta of force compared to human decision-making.‖); Noel Sharkey, The 
Human Control of Weapons: A Humanitarian Perspective, 4 (2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
live/files/3948-sharkey—-human-control-of-weapons-pf-draftpdf (―It is vital that we take the 
opportunity to use the evolution of technology to ensure that the partnership between human and 
machine increases rather than diminishes the ability of humans to ensure the legitimacy of the 
targets of attack. Rather than making more and more hi-tech weapons with the aim of more 
effective killing and destruction of targets, would it not be better to create hi-tech weapons with 
the aim of having greater humanitarian impact?‖); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 
INT‘L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 687, 701–02 (2012) (―If technologies did exist that could 
distinguish civilians from combatants better than any human, or better than the average 
combatant, then those technologies should be deployed in a manner to assist the combatant in 
applying the principle of distinction, rather than used to eliminate human judgement. Similarly, if 
a technology were capable of determining a course of action which could achieve a military 
objective with minimal collateral damage, and minimize any disproportionate harms, then that 
technology could be employed by a human combatant charged with the duty of making an 
informed choice to initiate the use of lethal force in that situation.‖). 
30. See Margot Hirsch, These Are Weapons That Could Prevent Gun Violence, THE WASH. 
POST (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/12/11/these-
are-the-guns-that-could-prevent-gun-violence/ (discussing ―smart guns‖ as a means of curbing 
certain types of gun violence); David Szondy, Nuclear Weapons Write Their Own Security 
Codes, GIZMAG, (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.gizmag.com/llnl-nuclear-code/34864/ (discussing a 
system involving random number generation as a safeguard against nuclear weapons tampering). 
31. See Kevin Poulsen, Why the US Government Is Terrified of Hobbyist Drones, WIRED 
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/white-house-drone/ (defining GPS Geofencing as 
the creation of a virtual no-fly zone that prevents drone flight). 
_30.1_SMITH_ARTICLE 12 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  12:12 PM 
172 TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J. [30.1 
misjudgments or misadventures of combatants. 
These applications, whatever they are, could diminish the ―control‖ that some 
or even all humans have over the weapons entrusted to them. Again, this 
conclusion depends on the meaning given to the term: Control in the sense of 
commandeering implies a total authority that control in the sense of checking does 
not. ―Meaningful human control‖ appears to fall somewhere in between these two 
extremes: A human combatant must do more to initiate a lethal attack than merely 
fail to stop it, and yet that decision to attack need not be absolute. In other words, 
an informed human decision to kill is a necessary—but not necessarily a 
sufficient—condition for killing. In theory, both a human and an automated system 
could hold a veto over a lethal attack. 
―Meaningful human control,‖ however, at most captures only one side of this 
potential ―partnership between human and machine.‖  While resisting the myth of 
technological infallibility, the concept entrenches the myth of individual 
infallibility. Driving, which is a leading cause of death,  illustrates the tendency to 
privilege the autonomy of a particular actor over the safety of others. Motor 
vehicles are generally not equipped with speed limiters, seatbelt ignition locks, or 
alcohol ignition locks, each of which could substantially improve road safety even 
as their rare failure results in even rarer tragedy.  
This preference for human discretion has also influenced military decisions.  
According to Jeffrey Lewis of the Monterey Institute for International Studies, 
during the early Cold War ―the United States Air Force, particularly Strategic Air 
Command, generally resisted the introduction of technical safeguards out of 
concerns that such measures might make it more difficult to use the weapons in the 
event of a conflict.‖  Strategic Air Command‘s putative decision to originally set a 
launch code of ―00000000‖ for its missiles would, if true, provide the cardinal 
 
32. Sharkey, The Human Control of Weapons: A Humanitarian Perspective, supra note 29, 
at 4. 
33. See, e.g., National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 10 Leading Causes of 
Death by Age Group, United States—2013, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(2013), http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2013-
a.pdf; see also National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 10 Leading Causes of Injury 
Deaths by Age Group Highlighting Unintentional Injury Deaths, United States—2013, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-
charts/leading_causes_of_injury_deaths_highlighting_unintentional_injury_2013-a.gif 
(highlighting the frequency of driving-related deaths in the United States). 
34. Cf. R. v. Michaud, 2015 ONCA 585 (Can.), http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ 
decisions/2015/2015ONCA0585.htm (accepting the plaintiff‘s argument that an Ontario law 
requiring a speed limiter on his truck ―leaves him in physical danger in some situations‖ but 
nonetheless upholding the requirement as reasonable). 
35. See Noel Sharkey, The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the 
Protection of Civilians, 3 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 229, 237 (2011) (explaining the concerns 
regarding the lack of compliance of autonomous weapons under international law). 
36. Dan Lamothe, Air Force Swears: Our Nuke Launch Code Was Never ‘00000000’, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 21, 2014, 1:34 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears 
-our-nuke-launch-code-was-never-00000000/. 
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example of this preference.  
At some point, automated systems may perform better than humans in making 
real-time distinctions between civilians and combatants or between friendly and 
enemy combatants.  Such a development could bolster the argument for AWSs. 
But it could also lead to the argument, perhaps grounded in the IHL principle of 
distinction, that individual combatants should not have unfettered discretion over 
the use of their weapons. As a practical matter, this would be a difficult argument: 
A restrictive system that fails to identify a threat (and thus generates a false 
negative) could, in an extreme case, leave a combatant without the means to 
defend herself or others from imminent danger.  
Broad endorsement of the importance of human ―control‖ could make this 
argument for restrictive technologies even more difficult. If humans are in the best 
position to make real-time decisions about the use of lethal force, then a system 
that restricts that discretion might be as suspect as one that displaces that 
discretion. A principle based in part on a fear of flawed robots may distract from 
the demonstrated possibility of flawed humans. 
A more holistic approach to the use of lethal force should, on the assumption 
that both human and machine are flawed, consider the roles of each vis-à-vis each 
other.  Such an approach would explicitly treat humans as elements of a system 
rather than as users of that system. It would appropriately focus more attention on 
actors other than the immediate initiator of a lethal attack, including the designers 
of the human-machine system itself. 
These issues are not new: Militaries are already complex systems of 
autonomous agents—generally human—who act and interact in ways far more 
nuanced than chains of command (or the lack thereof) may suggest.  This focus 
may in turn demand a more robust conception of command responsibility and the 
extension of that responsibility to cases of machine action. Although command 
responsibility is beyond the scope of this article, its potentially vexing distinction 
between act and omission is not. 
 
37. See id. (citing Bruce G. Blair, Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark, CTR. FOR DEF. 
INFO.:BRUCE BLAIR‘S NUCLEAR COLUMN (Feb. 11, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web 
/20120511191600/http:/www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm (discussing the concern 
that too many safeguards would interfere with a necessary launch than the concern of accidental 
launches)). 
38. See Sharkey, The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Protection 
of Civilians, supra note 35, at 237 (explaining the advancements in automated systems needed to 
distinguish civilians and combatants, such as through more accurate and discriminative sensing 
and visions systems). 
39. In contrast, false positives—errantly identifying a threat—pose the greatest challenge 
for AWSs. See John P. Sullins, An Ethical Analysis of the Case for Robotic Weapons Arms 
Control, NATO CCD COE  (2013), https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings/d2r1s9_sullins 
.pdf (discussing the possibility of a false positive error of indiscriminant use of force by a robot). 
40. Sharkey, The Human Control of Weapons: A Humanitarian Perspective, supra note 29, 
at 6. 
41. Id. at 6–7 (explaining automatic and controlled processes in human psychology). 
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LETHAL ACTION VERSUS INACTION 
The preceding discussion assumed a bright line between automated systems 
that initiate lethal attacks and those that restrict such attacks. Under this 
assumption, the chief objection to ―meaningful human control‖ was that it risked, 
however subtly, precluding the latter in order to prohibit the former. This section 
introduces a different complication: An automated system that selectively restricts 
an attack initiated under the ―meaningful control‖ of a human, in some situations, 
is functionally equivalent to an automated system that simply initiates the attack 
directly. 
Cluster munitions provide a contemporary example. A lethal attack is at least 
arguably initiated when the cluster munition is dropped or launched under 
―meaningful human control‖ as originally defined.  At some point after this 
initiation, a basic munition would split into submunitions, each of which might 
explode anytime, anywhere, and on anything or anyone.  In contrast, an advanced 
munition would split into advanced submunitions, each of which would be 
―designed to detect and engage a single target object,‖ ―equipped with an 
electronic self-destruction mechanism,‖ and ―equipped with an electronic self-
deactivating feature.‖  
If they function properly, these advanced submunitions would automatically 
restrict the attack in both duration and target.  This restriction would be absolute: 
Even if the pilot wanted the submunitions to deploy more indiscriminately, she 
would be unable to direct them to do so. The restriction would not thwart 
―meaningful human control‖ as long as that term is interpreted to permit automated 
systems that limit rather than initiate lethal attacks.  And it would seem to be 
desirable; indeed, such designs are intended to ―avoid indiscriminate area effects 
and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions.‖  
Further refinements of these weapons may be even more desirable. For 
example, a submunition might also be designed to automatically deactivate if it 
 
42.  See Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 2.2, May 30, 2008, 39 U.N.T.S. 2688 
(prohibiting parties from using, developing, or transferring certain cluster munitions). The 
Convention has been ratified by nearly 100 states —but not by the United States, China, or 
Russia; for a list of all signatories, see Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention Status, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/the-convention/convention-status (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
43.  Id. at art. 2.2 (―‗Cluster munition‘ means a conventional munition that is designed to 
disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes 
those explosive submunitions.‖). 
44.  Id. (providing characteristics of more advanced submunitions). 
45.  See Tyler Rogoway, How Dumb Cluster Bombs Are Becoming Heinously Smart, 
FOXTROT ALPHA (Dec. 29, 2014), http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-dumb-cluster-bombs-
got-heinously-smart-1673486769 (―The self destruct and self inert capabilities of emerging 
submunitions . . . alleviates, at least to [a] small degree, concerns about the unintended effects of 
using cluster munitions . . . .‖). 
46.  See Horowitz & Sharre, supra note 2, at 14. 
47.  Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 42, at art. 2.2; Cf., e.g., U.S. Department 
of State, Cluster Munitions, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c25930.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) 
(―[C]luster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons, such 
as a larger bomb or larger artillery shell would cause, if used for the same mission.‖). 
_30.1_SMITH_ARTICLE 12 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  12:12 PM 
2016] CONTROLLING HUMANS AND MACHINES 175 
 
detects a person of small stature or if it lands near a structure coded on a map as a 
hospital, or it might be designed to explode only if a vehicle with certain 
characteristics passes by it. Each of these restrictions would presumably represent 
a laudable improvement over a basic cluster munition. And, as restrictions, they 
would seem to remain consistent with a principle of ―meaningful human control.‖ 
This combination of human initiation plus automated limitation of an attack, 
however, may be difficult to distinguish in practical terms from the automated 
initiation of distinct attacks. In the former case, a human combatant might deploy a 
weapon against a broad target on the assumption that the weapon itself would 
selectively exclude particular elements of that target from lethal effect.  In the 
latter case, a human combatant might activate a weapon that automatically 
determines what targets to include rather than to exclude.  Indeed, Israel‘s 
Harpy—‖an anti-radar weapon that flies a search pattern over a wide area 
searching for [and then dive-bombing into] enemy radars‖ —could arguably 
constitute either an automated attack or the automated restriction of a human 
attack. 
These categories could overlap in another way as well: Human combatants 
might come to rely on automated systems that limit attacks just as they may come 
to rely on automated systems that recommend targets. A human who expects that 
an automated system will restrict an attack to lawful targets may be more willing to 
initiate such an attack.  Even if the automated system succeeds, this reliance 
would implicitly delegate more authority to the automated system. 
Similar issues regarding human factors arise in the ―mushy middle‖ of driving 
automation, where driving tasks are shared sequentially or simultaneously by the 
human driver and the automated driving system.  One response to the problem of 
undue reliance by the human has been to design the vehicle to monitor whether the 
driver actually remains alert.  In this way, both human and machine supervise the 
other.  Similarly, advanced weapon systems might incorporate some form of dual 
supervision in which machine ―control‖ is as important as human ―control.‖ 
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CONCLUSION 
Control can be obviously confusing and—more alarmingly—subtly 
confusing. It means so much that, without careful and persistent qualification, it 
ends up meaning very little. For this reason: 
[C]ontrol is more useful as a structure than as a standalone term. Those 
who would deploy it should first describe the control system they 
actually intend: the goals, inputs, processes, and outputs to the extent 
they are determined by a human designer and the authority of the human 
or computer agents to the extent they are not.  
―Meaningful human control‖ hints at, but ultimately risks missing, much of 
this system complexity. A human combatant is not merely the user of an automated 
weapon system that she checks or commandeers. Rather, human and machine both 
empower and limit the other. Even this duality obfuscates the wide range of 
elements in a system designed to effectively deploy lawful force. A military, after 
all, is much more than a soldier and a gun. 
The fundamental functional question is whether such a system—a modern 
military committed to international humanitarian law—can remain robust when 
human or machine elements fail. Whether any given element is human or machine 
is a secondary question. So too is what particular relationship exists between any 
two elements. Asking who controls what (or what controls whom) within the 
system does not necessarily reveal whether the system is itself under control. 
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